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Abstract
This Essay discusses the challenges to protect the public from a myriad of harms related
to new, and poorly understood, vulnerabilities arising from the frontier of cyberspace and how
international law can offer protection against the global potential for harm.

IS INTERNATIONAL LAW READY FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE?
M.E. Bowman*
It was a seminal event that ended the carnage in 1648. The
military peace that followed the Thirty Years War was a mere respite, but the Peace of Westphalia cast a measure of political stability. Westphalia was midwife to the legal concept of the nation

state, sovereign within its borders. At Westphalia, an agreement'
was crafted that memorialized and solidified the concept that
physical security gives rise to international stability.
Stemming from that agreement, national borders and sovereign integrity have now been the benchmarks of stability for
more than three centuries. Even today, nations reach the brink
of conflict over disputed title to barren island rocks, wastelands
of sand, tundra, or ice and border claims centuries old. Nations
are quick to use available international fora to bristle at slights,
real or imagined.
So important is the concept of sovereignty that just in our
lifetimes, a multitude of conflicts have erupted in the name of
Westphalian dominion. Yet, in the brief measure of our children's lives, the territorial concept of stability is being challenged. Today, economic transactions, political intercourse, and

technological developments, much of which span previously im* Associate General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the FBI or the Department of
Justice.
1. The Congress of Westphalia (1643-48) was Europe's first great peace conference and the first international gathering of importance since the Council of Constance (1414-18). Almost every act of the treaty that ended the war emphasized the
importance of the sovereign state. In practical terms, it represented the death knell of
the Holy Roman Empire, gave sovereignty to German and Swiss principalities, fixed
borders in France, Sweden, and the Netherlands and ushered in an era of national wars
for territorial and economic aggrandizement. Beyond any doubt, it laid the formal
foundations for the modern state system. For additional information on the Congress

of Westphalia and the Council of Constance, see H. NEUFELD,

THE INTERNATIONAL PRO-

TECTION OF PRIVATE CREDITORS FROM THE TREATIES OF WESTPHALIA TO THE CONGRESS OF

VIENNA (1648-1815) (1971); Henry Wheaton, History of the Progressof the Law of Nations in

EuropeFrom the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna With an HistoricalNotice of That
Law Before the Peace of Westphalia 77 EDINBURGH REy. 303 (1843); PHILLIP H. STUMP, THE
REFORMS OF THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE 1414-18 (1994).
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pregnable international barriers, have become significant, even
critical, to national security and international stability alike.
To take their place in world affairs today, nations require
access to information, global financial markets, instantaneous
communications, and other trappings of the information age.
The preservation of secure borders, physical resources, and national honor remain crucial concepts of national security, but
international standards and centuries of experience help us
meet the daily problems of Westphalian sovereignty. In contrast,
there are few international standards to deal with the burgeoning capabilities of nations and their constituents to obtain
and manipulate information.
To collate, analyze, manage, and protect the data on which
society has come to rely is an enormous but manageable task.
Similarly, providing public access to information and communications is a daunting challenge, but one capable of resolution.
The most formidable challenge is to protect the public from a
myriad of harms related to new, and poorly understood, vulnerabilities arising from the frontier of cyberspace.
The vulnerabilities created by access to information, and to
information architecture, outstrip by far, those of any analogous
reference point in the history of civilization. Every hacker, criminal and government with the equipment, minimal expertise, and
raw determination to intrude has the capability of bringing harm
to both individuals and structures.
This is the electronic equivalent of terrorism or guerrilla
warfare. The effect of an attack on modern information systems
is not unlike the Mongol way of fighting seven centuries ago.
With vastly inferior numbers, the Mongols conquered enormous
territories by learning enemy strengths and vulnerabilities while
keeping their own secret. Avoiding direct confrontation, they
attacked the flanks and the rear of the enemy or bypassed the
enemy altogether. They disrupted communications, attacked at
times and places of their own choosing, and terrorized adversaries into submission. Today, cyberspace is ripe for similar tactics.
The prototype target of attack is not new. The origin of
global networks, and today's Internet, is international banking
and international corporate ventures. World markets created
the need for globalization and that need has spawned an enormous network of communications systems. In particular, the In-
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ternet geometrically expands the concept of access. It democratizes information exchange in a way that inextricably links the
global community while enhancing both personal and institutional vulnerabilities.
I.

NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Computers have solved the analyst's nightmare of collation
of a geometrically increasing body of data. On the other hand,
they have created a crucible of social, economic, and physical
dependence on electronic communications. That crucible, in
domestic terms, will be known as the National Information Infrastructure ("NII"). A logical step-child of the Internet, the NII is
growing from existing networks to become more powerful, more
necessary, and more widely used than anything we possibly could
have imagined a scant few years ago.
Although still inchoate, the NII is a system composed of
high-speed telecommunications networks, databases, and advanced computer systems; together these make electronic information widely available and accessible. The NII is being
designed, built, owned, operated, and used by the private sector,
but its functional advantages are societal. In a very real sense,
the NII is U.S.-style democratization. Whether domestic or
global, it will ameliorate the constraints of geography, economics, and disability, giving the ordinary citizen a means of global
access and personal participation that rivals the town meeting.
Already the NII is integral to many Federal programs and
many Federal agencies are becoming dependent on it for execution of their missions. There is little question that the NII of the
future increasingly will support a wide variety of vital programs
as disparate as air traffic control and compilation of census data.
Response to natural disaster and delivery of government benefits
will depend on the NII. Power grids, transportation systems, financial institutions, and economic transactions all will rely on
NII capabilities.
Information truly is the critical infrastructure of modern society. U.S. information capabilities have exposed North Korean
nuclear weapons programs, uncovered Russian and Chinese nuclear dealings with Iran, and facilitated U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq. These same capabilities turn as easily to non-mili-
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tary benefits such as discerning environmental dangers, advancing agricultural research, or facilitating medical studies.
Thanks to Cold War investments in information processing
capabilities, the United States has an unparalleled capability to
integrate complex information systems, but this is a transitory
monopoly. Information dependence is a growing global phenomenon that directly affects military, political, economic, and
social resources alike. In some cases, the strengths of these traditional resources are diminished, in others they are enhanced;
each transition represents an evolution of global interdependence. At minimum, this means it is in the U.S. interest to promote a common information infrastructure with standard reference points. Only in commonality can security and international
cooperation be assured.
Unfortunately, vulnerabilities are inherent within these benefits. Public safety and the national defense call for a somewhat
anomalous need, a secure NII. Access, not security is both the
purpose and the hallmark of the NII. Individual privacy, public
speech, private enterprise, all cherished aspects of American life,
are social, if not legal, barriers to regulation and investigation
alike. Even in formative stages, the NII is sparking a debate over
dichotomous public interests.

II.

NI VULNERABILITY

Profit and peril are the reciprocals of NII access; the benefits we obtain all yield a vulnerability. We enjoy the facility of
electronic banking, but security experts estimate that sophisticated "hackers" commit some thirty-six electronic bank robberies of US$1 million or more each year.2 Even the sophisticated
technology of our intelligence agencies may be inadequate. As
one former official stated, " [ f]oreign intelligence services have
gained access to classified information in U.S. computers by remote means ... and we have done the same thing to them."'
As a nation we possess the most formidable fighting capability in the world, but one dependent on computer security. Artillery and rockets are directed by computers, our armies are
guided to precise locations by satellite communications, and mil2. That Wild, Wild CyberspaceFrontier,INFO. WAR & QVBERSPACE SEC., Fall 1995, at 1.
3. Jay Peterzell, Spying and Sabotage &y Computer,TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 25; see Soviet
Computer Woes Raise Espionage Threat, ADVANCED MIL. COMPUTING, Sept. 29, 1988, at 1.
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itary aircraft have software programs exceeding half a million
lines of logic. This dependence creates a unique opportunity for
undetected algorithmic sabotage, computer spoofing, or both.
Dependence on computer logic means that the failure to anticipate a problem will yield a technological vulnerability. During
the Falklands-Malvinas conflict, when two Argentine aircraft on
closely parallel courses attacked a British warship, the British Sea
Wolf missile defense system was unable to cope with an unanticipated attack profile. 4 Unable to handle the situation, the
software shut down automated systems, leaving the ship virtually
defenseless.
Public safety depends in many ways on electronic communications. The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") diligently
maintains a mantle of safety in increasingly crowded skies, but it
depends on computers. An unfriendly power or terrorist group
could develop the capability for a devastating, concerted attack
on FAA computers nationwide. Recently, the radars at the busy
Pittsburgh airport were blinded for six full minutes,5 giving us a
snapshot of what a test of a capability to attack that system could
be like.
We enjoy the ability to summon rapidly emergency police or
rescue aid by dialing 911, but that too is a severable lifeline. This
became apparent in 1991-92 when a computer attack utilizing
multistate switching overloaded the Virginia and Maryland 911
systems with spurious calls. Since then, intruders have learned
that they can frustrate investigation by attacking through multinational switching.
Further, it does not require the resources of a government
to penetrate even "secure" computer systems. To take advantage
of computer technology, communications systems have been
melded together by a patchwork system of hardware and
software technology and the common telephone. Computer-tocomputer communications yield enormous benefit, but also a
quantitative increase in the vulnerability of individual systems.
This has been highlighted in recent years by computer hackers
who have gained notoriety for their intrusions into the computer
4. Boorman & Levitt, Software Warfare and Algorithm Sabotage, SiGNAL, May 1988, at
75.
5. PittsburghAirport's RadarScreens Go Out for 6 Minutes,
1, 1996, at 6A.
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systems of others, particularly government-associated computer
systems. These are serious vulnerabilities. The individual event
itself, even if successful, may be wholly clandestine, making it
difficult or impossible even to know the penetration has occurred. Unlike theft of tangible property, information stored
electronically may be retrieved and copied an infinite number of
times without leaving evidence of the intrusion.
Hackers, whose intentions may range from benign to destructive, are the progenitor problem. "Hacking" gained notoriety when the Chaos Computer Club broke into NASA computers
in 1987,6 generating fear as much for the ability to put "viruses"
into the computer systems as for the potential to withdraw sensitive information. The complexity of the problem became apparent after it required the dogged, months-long effort of an astronomer and computer expert to prove to government officials that
some forty government systems had been penetrated from
abroad. In the end, the astronomer's efforts proved that a group
of West German hackers, possibly in the employ of East bloc intelligence agents, were responsible.
When even the ability to control level flight is computer dependent, there is the possibility that effective warfighting may be
waged, or preparedness inhibited, merely by tampering with
computer or associated software systems. 7 Similarly, the effect of
undetected defects could be disastrous for warfighting, transportation systems, flood control, or economic institutions.
Even the harmless virus inserted by "friendly" hackers can
be both fiscally and physically destructive. In a case that captured the headlines, a relatively benign virus, intended only to
spread a "worm" across the Internet, replicated faster than expected, quickly shutting down the entire system.' The potential
6. Keith Stone, Cyberspace Crawls with Crooks, Spies, Computer Cops Warn, Hous.
Sept. 11, 1994, at C9.

CHRON.,

7. See Peter Grant & Robert Richie, The Eagle's Own Plume, in NAVAL INST. PROC.,
July 1983. Aircraft have, in fact, crashed due to software design defects. One author

suggests that the crash of two U.S. Air Force F-117 stealth fighters in identical, suspicious circumstances, might suggest a "bug" in the software. A worse problem will be
logic bombs, or viruses bugs. See Stefan Geisenheyner, The Dangers Lurking in Militay
Software Production: Viruses, Trojan Horses and Logic Bombs, ARMADA INT'L, Oct.-Nov. 1989,
at 22.
8. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP., INFORMATION WARFARE: LEGAL, REGULATORY,
POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSURANCE 2-7 (1995); Loring
Wirbel, Swat Team for Viruses, ELECTRONIC ENG. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1988, at 17.
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for the virus, logic bomb, or algorithmic sabotage to create
chaos in computer systems is so great that in 1988 the Pentagon
temporarily severed the connections between Department of Defense computers and a corporate computer network that had
been compromised..
The potential for intrusion has not appreciably diminished.
The Defense Information Security Agency ("DISA") recently reported that 88% of defense computer systems are easily penetrated.9 Of the successful penetrations it conducted, 96% were
not detected.10 Equally disturbing, of those detected, 95% were
not reported,11 perhaps because hacking incidents have not yet
been compelling. DISA continues to report possible intrusions
of government computer systems numbering in the thousands.
III.

PROTECTING THE Nil

As distressing as these statistics may be, they can mislead the
reader. This vulnerability is not one solely affecting government
or big business. Individuals also may be harmed directly by NII
attacks. By attacking individual data files, it is possible to steal or
corrupt personal records such as health, education, consumer
purchases, tax filings, or credit history. Put simply, this is electronic terrorism.
Beyond cavil, there exists a need for effective law and oversight of both the NII itself and of public safety-related uses of the
NIL. A sound legal system that applies both civil and criminal
penalties is essential. Existing laws provide some protection, but
the harms to be prevented challenge both application and enforcement as technology increasingly facilitates familiar crimes
and generates new ones.12 The NII will be used to smuggle stolen corporate information, to transmit child pornography, to
sabotage industrial or financial databases, to electronically stalk,
9. See Neil Munro, The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic PearlHarbor,WASH.
POST, July 16, 1995, at C3 (reporting statements of Robert Ayers, Chief of DISA's Warfare Division).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The U.S. Government recognized at the turn of the century that the telecommunications infrastructure was critical to national security and economic progress.
Since then, there have been many communications-related laws and regulations enacted. Even so, technology has far outstripped the legal and regulatory scheme of the
United States. For most of the World, legal protection in this area is sadly deficient.
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threaten, or to perpetrate fraud. All of these capabilities, as nations are rapidly discovering, transcend national boundaries.
Media issues today are diverse, sometimes arcane, sometimes bizarre, and ever increasing in complexity. Not long ago, a
Pakistani cleric asked the U.S. Department of State to extradite
Madonna and Michael Jackson because their music violates Islamic law. We might be amused by that sort of request, but the
underlying social and cultural issues are serious.
In the United States, an attempt to protect children with a
legislative ban on "indecent" material was, as expected, blocked
by a federal judge to ensure protection of constitutional values.
France recently banned a book that violated its laws, only to find
that same book immediately available on the Internet. Germany
unsuccessfully has resisted both pornography and racial hatred
messages on the Internet. China, ethnocentrically, is trying to
insulate its citizenry by excluding the Internet and creating an
indigenous version.
These are but a taste of the future. The explosion of cyberspace activities gives rise to vulnerabilities that reach into the entire social spectrum. The potential villains are hackers,"5 disgruntled employees, criminals,1 4 terrorists, commercial organizations,15 and even nations. 6 To complicate matters further,
cyberspace attacks are virtually indistinguishable one from another. Even if adequate laws and technological safeguards did
exist, the anonymous nature of an intrusion would make it difficult to prioritize investigations.
It will be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to know
whether an intrusion represents the exuberance of a curious,
youthful hacker or a test of destructive information warfare capabilities. At best, the distinctions between "crime" and "warfare,"
"accident" and "attack" will be blurred. The resources for mayhem in cyberspace are within reach of virtually every aspect of
13. One hacker lifted 20,000 credit card numbers from various systems before he
was tracked down by a computer security expert who had been provoked by the hacker.
14. An electronic Clyde Barrow, working from St. Petersburg, invaded a Citibank
computer and stole more than US$10 million. Russians Arrest 6 in Computer Thefts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at D5.

15. Almost daily, commercial organizations report instances of economic espionage and theft.
16. Recently, the Russian Government acknowledged that its espionage apparatus
was being turned increasingly to the acquisition of foreign technology.

1996]

INFORMATION AGE

1943

domestic and international society, and few users understand,
and many choose not to accept, any need for communal responsibility.
Certainly, the United States needs to consider carefully how
to protect the public from the vulnerabilities arising from the
NII, but as with few other innovations, the NII and its inevitable
counterparts will affect the entire global community. The real
nub of the problem is that even a national legal system that directly addresses the NII issues will be only marginally beneficial
if international norms of behavior do not develop.
The central problem is ambiguity. The threats of cyberspace are less coherent, less tangible, and certainly less foreseeable, than military confrontation. More to the point, international coalitions traditionally flow from military bases; a coalition
based on cyberspace threats would represent a quantum leap in
international investigatory cooperation. Traditional, but outmoded concepts of strength and vulnerability ranging from the military to gross national product, will inevitably obscure the contemporary reality of the power of information.
Unfortunately, international computer offenses are easier to
commit than traditional international crimes, if for no other reason than that they require little in the way of manpower and
resources. A destructive attack on the NII could be carried out
as a means of warfare or terrorism with little risk of instigating
physical conflict and possibly even without source detection.
There are no visa or passport requirements and no checkpoints,
only keystrokes. Moreover, few nations adequately guard against
the harm. Even the United States, easily the most computer-organized nation in the world, is poorly mobilized for computer
attacks.
NII disruption has the potential, if not the certainty, of
springing forth quickly, dramatically, and destructively. The potential for economic abuse, sabotage, theft, and common crime
is disturbing. Moreover, the problems created by a global NII
attack would transcend all boundaries, confuse cultural mores,
and confound contemporary laws. Because simple keystrokes
can generate propaganda, enflame passions, or create artificial
fears, the further potential for undermining the cohesiveness of
national and international social structures is frightening.
The threat is particularly disquieting for developing nations
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that still have loose bonds of social cohesion. Efforts of developed nations to protect social values from harm via the Internet
speak eloquently to the proposition that cultural, social, economic, even military strengths potentially can be undermined by
abusing digital technology. Of course, the other side of that
coin is that modern communications, appropriately encouraged
and protected, can contribute to the growth of democratic concepts.
IV.

A PAUCITY OF LAW

Most nations have no laws against breaking into computers
and those that do generally have only weak ones. The few with
strong laws find implementation difficult because of the need
for the still distant goal of international cooperation. Worse,
some nations seem to tolerate the venality of computer hacking.
The United States has, for example, identified overt bulletin
boards in several nations, easily accessed, that are being used to
develop and perfect viruses, propagate copyrighted programs,
and frustrate intellectual property rights.
The first problem of international cooperation is simply to
define the problem. The United States has a plethora of relevant laws which may or may not apply to a particular NII attack,
and most nations are even more deficient. We are already at a
point in history when cybertechnology requires an international
understanding of the problem and a common frame of reference for combatting it. None now exists.
An oversimplistic statement of a second problem is venue.
Traditionally, legal venue is found at the situs of an event, or in a
res, or with a person. If an offense has an international dimension, venue may lie in the country where the offender is located,
where the victim may be, or, occasionally, even in the nation
through which the communications travel. Technology, however, has begun to confuse jurisdiction and venue because cyberspace crimes inevitably will transcend national and international
boundaries.
More than the problem of international narcotics trafficking, more than weapons proliferation, more than international
terrorism, the NII threat cannot be confronted effectively without close and concerted international cooperation and similar
laws. Foreign nations generally must have similar law before
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they will agree to cooperate, extradite, or expel the offender,
and frequently they are very reluctant to relinquish their own
nationals for foreign punishment.
To illustrate the fundamental need for cooperation, consider first a purely domestic attack on a defense computer system. Assuming the attack is detectable, it is still unlikely that a
sophisticated intruder will leave an audit trail. The conduit of'
attack may lead across several state lines, requiring a trace of
calls across state borders, and even, perhaps, through several carrier systems.
This frustrates beyond current legal procedure the traditional concepts of judicial warrant. Presumably the United
States could, and should, ameliorate this problem with legislation to create some sort of national warrant process. That may
be a daunting challenge, but not half so daunting as the international dimension. There exists now a facile ability to route an
attack through multiple nations, making effective investigation
improbable. On a positive note, the Council of Europe is addressing procedural problems of cyberinvestigation, such as how
quickly to "trap and trace" an attack.
The problem, however, transcends both law and technology. Even assuming that legal norms come into being, common
international social structures must exist to permit the law to
work. A reasonably common international security architecture
is needed. Ethical responsibility will be a common educational
requirement, but one requiring individual national initiative.
There is a need to put international flesh on skeletal concepts of
privacy, confidentiality, and emergency response. Only with an
underpinning of global involvement can there be an effective
oversight and enforcement mechanism.
The United States laid these issues on the table at the 1995
G-7 Ministerial Conference on the Information Society. The G-7
agreed to find creative, technological and policy solutions to improve "the reliability and security of national and international
networks ... by developing security principles that are commen-

surate with the risk and magnitude of harm."17
The problem, however, requires more than an articulation
of goals, it requires urgent action. Whereas most international

17. Exec. Office of the President, National Information Infrastructure: Draft Report on "NII Security: The Federal Role," 60 Fed. Reg. 32,038 (1995).
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problems grow somewhat slowly, this one will not. The developments of cybertechnology and the NII are moving forward at
warp speed while national and international efforts to meet the
threat creep. Worse, because international cooperation is a sine
qua non of remedy, the ability to confront the issue will grow at
the speed of the slowest participant.
A parallel effort is needed both within and between nations.
Governments must take the lead in serving as facilitators for promoting private sector responsibility. Critical research for security and assessment of public needs will require governmental resources. Governments themselves must be model users of the
NIL.
No doubt the potential dangers from sheer chaos that may
result from disruption of computer systems will lead eventually
to international norms of behavior. At present, however, a marginal tolerance for electronic burglary is a price that is being
paid for the ability to assimilate vast quantities of data, to communicate instantaneously world-wide and to control governmental and public service activities.
When the tolerance level has been reached, nations will begin more seriously to look for a remedy. Finding national remedies necessary but individually deficient, they will turn toward an
international remedy. In that venue, unlike most international
problems, they will find law to be the one viable avenue of approach.
Diplomacy, economic coercion, and other traditional approaches will be singularly unhelpful. In the final analysis, the
commonality of access and of international interdependence on
the NII will require a commonality in goals, remedies, and responsive investigative techniques. Only a concerted effort to develop international legal norms holds the potential for any measure of investigatory or remedial success.
International law can make a difference. More to the point,
only international norms of behavior can offer any realistic measure of protection against the global potential for harm. With
the certainty of death and taxes, the day will come when intcrnational law turns to the task already at hand; the fundamental
question is whether an electronic Pearl Harbor will be a global
prerequisite.

